My research develops a new framework for analyzing peace agreements that exclude a warring party as counterinsurgency strategies. I use this framework to develop a theory explaining which groups are most likely to be included in an agreement, how these agreements affect likely conflict duration and outcomes, as well as how provisions for military power-sharing are designed in multiparty civil conflicts. Because combatting multiple rebel groups strains a state’s counterinsurgency capacity, signing a peace deal that excludes one or more rebel group enables the state to redirect previously tied-down resources against the remaining insurgent groups. The opportunity to leverage one insurgent force against another encourages states to sign agreements with groups that they would not otherwise, as well as structure military power-sharing in fashions that facilitate the quick deployment of ex-combatants into counterinsurgency campaigns. To test this theory, I have collected original data on the variation in programs for integrating ex-combatants into the national military, as well as an in-depth case study of Colombia’s 1991 peace agreement.